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CHRISTIAN ORDER is a monthly magazine devoted to the promulgation of Catholic Social Teaching and incisive comment on current affairs in Church and State; at home and abroad; in the political, social and industrial fields.

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Paul Crane S J

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New Nazis

THE EDITOR

BY a somewhat curious paradox the franchise has been extended recently to a section of the community which seems least able to sustain the burdens necessarily imposed by what may be termed the democratic way of life. Those at the end of their teens now have the vote. Yet it is from their midst that a type of activity has come in defiance of values which must be upheld if democracy is to continue to exist. Reference here is particularly to the university young. They have shown themselves without regard for the elementary right of any opinion other than their own to be given expression. What characterizes them with extreme unpleasantness is a loud-mouthed intolerance, manifesting itself in a contempt for freedom of speech that is frightening and an arrogant disregard for established authority that borders on anarchy. "You satisfy our demands and we'll let you carry on with the lecture": this from an undergraduate of Sussex University to his Vice-Chancellor, Professor Asa Briggs. And it was not said from the body of the hall in which the Professor was speaking. The ill-mannered tough had marched up to the rostrum which he was thumping with his fist whilst he shouted these words in the Professor's face. Or, again, after the Ambassador of

South Vietnam had been prevented from speaking at the London School of Economics and roughed up on the platform by student thugs: "We control L.S.E.", said one of them, "therefore we will throw him out on the streets. When we control the streets we will throw him out of the country".

This is the language of Hitler's young storm troops, the bully-boys who rode with him to power in the Germany of the thirties. Their savagery was copied with frightening exactitude by Cambridge University layabouts who showed their opposition to the present regime in Greece by smashing up a public dinner party held in one of the town's hotels as one of a number of festivities to mark the occasion of "Greek Week". Peaceful demonstration was not in question here. It was a simple case of preventing those with whom the Cambridge thugs disagreed from the outward expression of any contrary view. There was no question here of attempted persuasion through friendly discussion. Argument was by punch-up. Victory went to the men of muscle. Might became right that night in Cambridge as it did in Germany with Hitler in the thirties.

It is, of course, true that these young university roughs represent a minority. It does not follow, however, that the majority, thereby, is absolved from blame. Its members ought to control the minority; assert themselves and put the louts in their place. Their failure to do so is, at this stage, inexcusable. It witnesses only to an over-concern with themselves and their careers very similar to that which caused so many "good" Germans in the thirties to turn a blind eye to Hitler's atrocities, stop their ears and pretend to know nothing about it all because unprepared for the heavy sacrifice which doing something about it necessarily entailed. It is exactly the same in this country today. I am in no kind of sympathy with the law-abiding silent majority of students who want no part of the intolerant barbarism purveyed by the new Nazi few in English universities today, yet refuse to do anything about it. They will have to do something about it if they want university life to continue in this country, to say nothing of democracy itself.

Father James Quin, Ph. D. is Professor of Philosophy at St. Peter's College, Cardross, Dumbarton, Scotland.

Some time ago we asked him for a series of articles on Secular Humanism, which is increasingly active at the moment and increasingly poisonous in its effect on this country's moral life.

Father Quin has sent us a series of three articles which constitute a devastating and brilliant criticism of a book entitled "Humanism" written by H. J. Blackham, Secretary of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, and Director of the British Humanist Association. These articles need close study. Readers will profit from them. We are proud to publish them.

Secular Humanism Examined

I: HUMANISM AND HUMAN REASON

REV. JAMES QUIN, Ph. D.

HUMANISM is as difficult to define as the length of a piece of elastic; it has quite a stretch. Atheists, like Jean Paul Sartre, call themselves humanists; agnostics, like Julian Huxley, and neo-thomists, like Jacques Maritain, call themselves humanists; and Teilhard de Chardin has won world-wide acclaim for his visionary version of Christian humanism. What then is humanism?

Humanism began as a reaction against a theocentric interpretation of human existence — so theocentric that human values were considered to have no real value and

human endeavour valuable only insofar as it centred on things divine. The early humanists opposed this depreciation of human values and set about cultivating those values they thought valuable in themselves. St. Thomas Aquinas heralded the movement by defending the independent value of human reason even in its approach to God. But the movement proper began with the Renaissance, the blossoming out of human truth, goodness and beauty in philosophy, science and art.

This cultivation of human values was looked upon by many as a rejection of the Christian way of life. For them, the Christian is in the world but not of the world; he should therefore despise the things of this world and concentrate his attention on the things of the world to come. In this view, presumably, all really committed Christians would follow in the footsteps of the Fathers in the desert, don sackcloth and ashes, sing psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles and let the rest of the world go by. No doubt the Fathers in the desert lived a highly spiritual way of life but theirs is not the only way to live a highly spiritual life. Indeed, it would be disastrous for the development of the Mystical Body of Christ if all really committed Christians devoted their lives to celibacy and contemplation.

There is a sense in which the Christian is in the world but not of it; and it's not too easy to define. There is a kind of tension in the Christian way of life between one's involvement in things human and one's involvement in things divine. This tension is brought out very well by Teilhard de Chardin in *Le Milieu Divin* and is stated fairly briefly in a letter to one of his friends:

"What I mean is the reconciliation of progress and detachment — of a passionate and legitimate love for this great earth and unique pursuit of the kingdom of heaven. How is one to be more fully a Christian than anyone and at the same time more fully a man? It is all very well to study science, philosophy, sociology to please God and fulfil an assigned task. But this is not enough: unless I recognise in the midst of study and toil

the possibility of loving my work; unless I see I must give myself to it completely, that I consolidate my progress towards an absolute by reason of the conquests themselves (and not just by the moral value of my efforts); . . . then I shall remain uncommitted among my fellow men, and because of my religion they will regard me as a deserter who is only half a man . . . Cannot the object, the matter itself, of our human love be transfigured, transferred into the absolute and, in short, into the divine? . . . I want to love Christ with all my strength in the very act of loving the universe" Letter written in 1916).

In a previous article in *Christian Order* (August, 1964) I tried to show how Teilhard's thought developed, how he resolved this tension and reached a full-blown Christian humanism. His interpretation of Christian humanism may or may not be true, but some interpretation of Christian humanism must be true because God made man to use his natural powers to build up mankind in unity, truth, goodness and beauty, and so achieve the communion of mankind in union with God. It is by cultivating the human values of unity, truth, goodness and beauty that man promotes the well-being of mankind and strives towards his destiny. The fact that this final end of man can now be achieved only through the Redeeming-Incarnation does not destroy human nature or human values but requires their elevation to the supernatural level in Christ. To be a true Christian one must be a humanist; and, in the present order of Divine Providence, to be a true humanist one must be a Christian. This is the thesis I hope to establish in a negative way revealing the inhumanity of secular humanism.

Anti-Christian Humanism

So far I have tried to give the basic idea common to all forms of humanism, and that is the appreciation of human values and the effort to promote human culture for the progressive development of mankind. But there is one form of humanism which, nowadays, would claim to be the only form and has in large measure appropriated, or misappro-

priated, the title. This form of humanism is represented by the International Humanist and Ethical Union, formed in 1952, and the British Humanist Association, formed in 1963. It is secular and avowedly anti-Christian. In the words of H. J. Blackham who became secretary of the International Union and director of the British Association: "Humanism in Europe and America has to be in a preliminary way justification of a rejection of Christianity" (*Humanism*, p. 9). In these articles from now on when the term "humanism" is used, it will refer to this secular and anti-Christian variety. And, in order to avoid tedious qualifications, I will take Blackham's account of humanistic belief as being not unrepresentative of what humanists in general believe.

Blackham doesn't like saints. "I not only abhor the Napoleons of this world but also am repelled by St. Francis at the head of a bead-roll of saints in whom I feel my own humanity chilled, alienated, depressed, deflated, impoverished. The sublimated love of the saints, holy charity, the grace of God manifested in the rapture and the passion of the self-surrendered soul in whom Christ reigns seems to me a thin and shrill version of our nature compared with the genial humanity of a generous person" (p. 153). Although this humanist assessment of the lives of the saints is neither genial nor generous, I think it is true to say that humanists, if not always genial, are often generous and devote a good deal of time and effort in an attempt to improve the human situation. Their generosity and commitment would, at times, put many Christians to shame. But this neither proves the truth of humanism nor weakens the case for Christianity. The truth of any "—ism" can be judged only by examining its basic premises and the validity of the conclusions it draws. As every logician knows, true conclusions can be drawn by sound reasoning from false premises, and any kind of conclusion can be drawn by unsound reasoning from any kind of premises. Consequently it will be both less time-consuming and more scientific to examine the premises from which the humanists draw their conclusions rather than to attempt a critical appraisal of the many conclusions they draw.

Basis of Humanism

Since rationality is the hall-mark of the human animal, any form of humanism whether theistic, atheistic or agnostic, is bound to acknowledge the part reason plays in the conduct of human life, and must be prepared to defend its own rational basis. Blackham would agree with this but he is convinced, nevertheless, that rationality is the special prerogative of the anti-Christian humanist; he alone is a real humanist; he "is a rationalist, one who puts reason first; and he stresses the open mind, dedication to the disinterested search for truth" (p. 27). But in the opening sentence of the first paragraph of his first chapter Blackham informs us that humanism is based on assumptions — "Humanism proceeds from an assumption that man is on his own and this life is all and an assumption of responsibility for one's own life and for the life of mankind — an appraisal and an undertaking, two personal decisions. Less than this is never humanism" (p 13). And all this is very odd! An assumption, in the ordinary meaning-in-use, is something we accept as true without having or giving reasons for our acceptance. How then can the humanist claim to put reason first when he begins with assumptions? How can he claim to have an open mind and be dedicated to the disinterested search for truth, when, as Blackham admits, he "begins with two massive assumptions which close the mind and put a dogmatic end to the disinterested search for truth"? (p. 27)

Blackham's unsuccessful attempt to extricate himself from this rather odd position need not concern us here. We are concerned with the basis of humanism; and while it is true, as Blackham says, that humanism is based on "massive assumptions which close the mind and put a dogmatic end to the disinterested search for truth", the assumptions he mentions are not the real basic ones. The real basic assumptions of humanism are contained in its explicit or implicit philosophy of human knowledge and in its explicit or implicit philosophy of human nature; its moral philosophy is an off-shoot of both. For the remainder of this article we shall concentrate on the humanist's philosophy of knowledge;

in the second article we shall consider his philosophy of man, and in the third his philosophy of morals.

Humanism and Hume

The humanism of the British Association is an off-shoot of British Empiricism, and British Empiricism in all its forms, ancient and modern, is an off-shoot of the philosophy of David Hume. It is not surprising that Blackham should profess his love and veneration for Hume (p. 153). And it is only to be expected that humanists, in their effort to come to grips with the human situation, should "depend for this knowledge exclusively, in the long run, on propositions of the kind which scientists are engaged in establishing" (p. 31). This Humean interpretation of knowledge is what we call "empiricism" or "positivism" and it lies deep in the heart of humanism. Blackham admits it: "This assumption that only empirical natural knowledge is the truth is sometimes called 'positivism', and it is useful to have a name for it". But he adds, "to say that humanism on the intellectual side is positivism might be misleading" (ibid.) The humanist's reluctance to accept the label "positivist" is understandable, for positivism as a theory of knowledge has long been discredited. Few, if any, British philosophers at the present day would like to be called positivists. Even Bertrand Russell who was a compulsive empiricist found himself compelled to admit that positivism or "empiricism as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate" (*Human Knowledge*, p. 527).

A rose by any other name will smell the same, and a theory of knowledge which reduces the object of human knowledge to the material phenomena which science can investigate will still spell positivism, however it is pronounced. For the humanist, truth can be expressed only in "propositions of the kind which scientists are engaged in establishing". And this is positivism by any other name. But I have already dealt with the bankruptcy of positivism in general in a previous set of articles for *Christian Order* (May-October, 1962). There is, however, one aspect of the

question which I think might be worth emphasising and developing with regard to humanism in particular.

Humanism and the Principles of Reason

The humanist professes to be a "rationalist, one who puts reason first" (p. 27). Now no one can claim to put reason first, last or in the middle, unless he admits the basic principles on which the validity of reason depends. And he must admit these principles, not just as rules and regulations governing his mental processes; he must admit them as laws of being; for, if the principles to which our reasoning process must conform are mere logical laws with no counterpart in the ontological order, our reasoning is only mental gymnastics and gives us no information about the real world. The principle of contradiction, for instance, governs all our thinking and reasoning; we cannot think something to be what it is not, nor can we think something as not being what in fact it is. The principle of contradiction is a law of being because a thing is what it is and cannot at the same time be what it isn't. And the principle of contradiction is a law which governs our thinking and reasoning because thought to be true and reasoning to be valid must be in tune with reality and therefore harmonise with the laws of being. The reason why I can't THINK a square as circular is that a square cannot BE circular. The laws of thinking and reasoning are derived from the laws of being, because thinking and reasoning, under censure of error, must be in conformity with reality.

Now can anyone who professes to be a rationalist and put reason first deny that the value and validity of human reason presupposes that things can be reasoned about; in other words that things make sense, that things are intelligible? And any one who admits that things are intelligible is admitting the principle of the intelligibility of being, a principle that lies at the root of all reasoning, scientific and otherwise, and is the driving force behind man's quest for truth. Since we are dealing here with humanists who claim to put reason first, we need not embark on a long

epistemological digression in defence of the principle of intelligibility. Nor do we require a lengthy philosophical analysis of what the principle means. The principle of intelligibility simply means that for every intelligent question there is an adequate ontological answer, even if, as so often happens, we don't know enough to discover what the answer is. The principle therefore means that the exhaustive knowledge of reality would leave no unanswered questions; anyone who knew everything would know all the answers.

To anyone unfamiliar with philosophical thinking the previous paragraph may seem 'much ado about nothing', but the point has to be made and borne in mind, and its importance should emerge in due course. Another point to be made and kept in mind is that the principle of intelligibility is absolutely universal; it applies to everything; it covers the whole range of being. If anything could be unintelligible, everything would be unintelligible and human reason would have no value whatsoever — except perhaps for playing chess and doing crossword puzzles where it tries to rediscover a pattern of its own invention. A little reflection may make the point clear. Unless we are convinced that things can't just happen for no reason at all and that any explanation given must be sufficient to account for what happens, it would never be possible for us to assign a reason for anything and so claim to understand it. If a window can shatter for no reason at all or for any reason whatsoever, why blame the boy who threw the stone and exonerate the passer-by who threw a glance in the same direction. If a thing can happen for no reason, we can never say it happens for some particular reason; one reason is as good or as bad as another since no reason at all is required. And this is true not only of broken windows; it is true of everything. In all our reasoning about anything there is an expressed or suppressed premise which says: this thing is, therefore it is intelligible. And this is the principle of intelligibility. Deny the principle and you deny the possibility of reasoning. Unless being as being is intelligible, nothing is.

The humanist claims to put reason first and consequently must admit that things are intelligible; and in his own way he does. But I would suggest that if he accepted the value of human reason as whole-heartedly as he claims, he could not believe that "man is on his own and this life is all". This is the point I want to develop.

Humanism and Intelligibility

The principle of intelligibility means that all intelligent questions have ontological answers, but it does not tell us what these answers are. It does, however, tell us something about the answers whatever they may turn out to be. It tells us, for instance, that they cannot contradict one another because contradictory answers, if true, would make reality unintelligible. It tells us also that the ultimate answer to any line of questioning must be adequate because an inadequate answer only triggers off further questions and therefore cannot be ultimate. This means that the ultimate answer to the whole question of existence must be the existence of necessary being — something which is what it is, could not be otherwise and could not not-exist. This may seem a rather grandiose conclusion to draw from the banal experience of being able to understand things, but again a little reflection may reveal the truth of the conclusion. An ultimate answer must be an adequate answer and an adequate answer is one that leaves no room for further question. But the only answer that leaves no room for further questions is one that affirms necessity. If I ask why there is a triangle drawn with white chalk on a blackboard and I am told that the geometry master drew it, the answer is not adequate because I can still ask why he drew a triangle rather than a circle, why he used white chalk rather than yellow, and why on the blackboard. But if I ask why the interior angles of the triangle add up to two right angles and it is demonstrated to my satisfaction that they could not possibly add up to anything else, I have no further questions; I have an adequate and therefore ultimate answer. When we know that something *must be* the case, it is un-

intelligent to ask why it is rather than is not. When, however, we know that something is the case but could just as easily be otherwise, it is unintelligent not to ask why it is rather than is not. In other words, a contingent situation—one which is but need not be—does not have in itself an adequate answer; it is not intelligible in itself. Consequently the ultimate adequate answer to the question of the existence of contingent being must contain some reference to the existence of a necessary being on which contingent being depends. Deny this and you deny the intelligibility of being; deny the intelligibility of being and you deny the value and validity of human reason, for the principle of intelligibility is the basic principle of every act of reasoning. If, therefore, the humanist denies the existence of necessary being, he is denying the intelligibility of being and the validity of human reason—but the humanist is a “rationalist, one who puts reason first!”

If any reader is inclined to accept this conclusion but at the same time fears he is being hoodwinked by a piece of intellectual legerdemain, he need not re-read the argument because his fear proves the truth of the conclusion. Why does he fear? Obviously because he is not convinced that the conclusion is necessary; he thinks it might be otherwise and as long as he thinks it might be otherwise, in his mind there is still room for further question. Only a clearly seen necessity will satisfy his intellectual demand for understanding and get rid of the question. And this is precisely the conclusion I have been trying to demonstrate. In spite of this he may still hesitate and wonder if his obvious intellectual demand for necessity need have any ontological response; perhaps this is just the way he thinks about things but things in themselves may be otherwise. In this case he is doubting the validity of reasoning and, at the same time, using his reason to substantiate the validity of his doubt. Now, reasoning is either valid or invalid. If it is invalid, his doubt has no rational foundation and should be dismissed as some form of neurotic disquiet. If, on the other hand, reasoning is valid, his reason for doubting the

validity of reasoning is self-destructive. Unless reasoning is something more than mental gymnastics or neurotic convulsions, it must be governed by the laws of being with which it must correspond under censure of error. Consequently the objective demands of reason are, by priority, the ontic demands of being. But reason demands the existence of necessary being as the ultimate answer to all intelligent questions about contingent beings. Therefore anyone who is a "rationalist, one who puts reason first" must admit the existence of necessary being.

Transcendent Necessary Being

Our existence in the world and the world in which we exist are contingent; nothing in our world is necessary. The world of our experience does not have within itself the reason why it is rather than is not. As Schopenhauer put it: "The non-existence of this world is just as possible as its existence". Since the world of human experience does in fact exist and cannot be unintelligible, its existence entails the existence of a *transcendent* order of being in which there is the necessity required to make it intelligible. Therefore our contingent existence depends on Transcendent Necessary Being — and this we call God. This conclusion follows with logical rigour from our experience of our own contingent existence in a contingent world, taken in conjunction with the principle of intelligibility which is the backbone of all reasoning. Consequently anyone who "puts reason first" cannot possibly believe that "man is on his own and this life is all".

Atheistic existentialists — who also call themselves humanists — are much more consistent than the humanists of the Blackham variety. They fully appreciate that if they follow reason and admit the intelligibility of being, they will have to admit the existence of God as Transcendent Necessary Being. But since the basic assumption of their philosophy is that God does not exist, they draw the only conclusion open to them and deny the intelligibility of being. Jean Paul Sartre, for instance, tells us that his philosophy is

"nothing else but an attempt to draw all the consequences from a consistent atheist position". This he does with impeccable logic and deduces the absurdity of existence. Sartre's only inconsistency is in trying to be consistent; his only logical fault is his belief in logical consequences; for, if being, as he says, is "inexplicable, absurd", it need not be consistent and there are no logical consequences. But Sartre sees, as Blackham obviously doesn't, that anyone who is a "rationalist, one who puts reason first" must admit the existence of Transcendent Necessary Being. And since he agrees with Blackham that "man is on his own and this life is all", he denies the intelligibility of being and proclaims the absurdity of human existence.

Humanism and Ultimate Questions

The belief that there is no answer to the ultimate question of human existence leaves the atheistic existentialist in a state of *angoisse*. Blackham, however, remains serene and unperturbed; not because he thinks he can answer the question but because he thinks the question should not be asked. It is the type of question science cannot answer; and since, for him, human knowledge is coextensive with "propositions of the kind which scientists are engaged in establishing", it is not the kind of question a rational person would be concerned with. In a section entitled *First and Last Questions* Blackham states his point of view in the form of a rhetorical question: "Is 'concern for the ultimate truth' a preoccupation with an ultimate Why? which science does not raise and cannot answer? If so, is there any sense in it, since the only answers to Why? are reasons such as causes of the kind science can trace?" (p. 42) This, of course, is sheer positivism and, as already mentioned, positivism as a theory of human knowledge is now discredited. Speaking of people like Blackham who remain serene and unperturbed by ultimate questions, Professor Lovell said in his Reith Lectures: "As far as this group is concerned, all that I can say is that sometimes I envy their ability to evade by neglect such a problem which can tear the individual's mind asunder".

But Blackham does try to temper his humanism with a touch of humanity when he admits that ultimate questions keep nagging at the mind; "they haunt the mind and will not be laid, whatever formulas are produced. There is a stubborn refusal to accept the world as self-explanatory and self-justifying" (p. 42). But Blackham thinks he's found a formula to lay the ghost and calm the troubled mind; and while Blackham makes many odd statements in *Humanism*, his formula of exorcism is the oddest of the odd. It amounts to this: Don't worry if there are some things you can't explain because everything can be explained in principle; on the other hand, don't worry if some things can't be explained in principle because nothing can be explained anyway. Am I misrepresenting Blackham? Let him speak for himself: "All things are equally explicable and inexplicable: explicable in that it can in principle be shown how everything came about or can be brought about and how it is related to other things; inexplicable in that everything is equally 'given' as it is and has to be accepted without further question. Our thinking begins and ends with things as we find them" (p. 42). Let's consider the two parts of this statement separately:—

(a) All things are explicable "in that it can in principle be shown how everything came about". Blackham has already said that human knowledge cannot go beyond "propositions of the kind which scientists are engaged in establishing" (p. 31). He has also already said that questions concerning "how things began and how they will end, why there is something rather than nothing, and why what is is as it is, are not questions which any of the sciences asks and are not questions which any of the sciences can attempt to answer" (p. 41). Now I submit, without fear of contradiction, that the logical conclusion from these two statements is that the question of how everything came about cannot in principle be answered. How then can Blackham maintain with the slightest degree of consistency that all things are explicable "in that it can in principle be shown how everything came about"?

(b) Things are also inexplicable, he says, "in that every-

thing is equally 'given' as it is and has to be accepted as it is without further question. Our thinking begins and ends with acceptance of things as we find them". No Thomistic philosopher would question Blackham's assertion that our thinking begins with the acceptance of things as they are; all thinking must begin with the data of experience. But what does Blackham mean by saying that thinking ends there? Unless we go beyond the data of experience and try to understand them, unless we try to grasp the metaphenomenal reality which the data manifest, we are not thinking at all; we are reducing ourselves to the level of naked apes who accept facts without question and make the best of them.

And this is the basic weakness of humanism. It accepts Hume's reduction of intellectual knowledge to sense knowledge and human psychology to animal psychology. Humanism is too Humean to be human! It would more aptly be called Naked-Ape-ism. This point will be developed in the following article.

Renewal Reminder

December is a very busy month for renewing subscriptions for *Christian Order*. It will help greatly if those whose subscriptions fall due in November renew promptly.

The New Covenant

FRANCIS FENN, S.J.

"This is the cup of my blood, the blood of the new and everlasting covenant" — Words of Consecration at Mass.

EVERYONE knows that the Bible is divided into what we call the Old Testament and the New Testament. "Testament" is derived from a Latin word (*testamentum*) which is itself a translation of a Greek word which can mean either a last will (*testament*) or a solemn agreement (*covenant*). In naming the divisions of the Bible, the former meaning was unfortunately chosen — unfortunately, since in the Bible the word signifies *covenant*. More accurately, then, the two parts of the Bible should be called the Old Covenant and the New Covenant, of which indeed they are the record.

A covenant in the Old Testament — which is full of them — was a verbal agreement, ratified by oath, made when written records were unknown. It was more binding than a contract, and established a sort of kinship between those who made it. It could be made between individuals — David and Jonathan made a covenant of friendship — or between small or larger groups of people, not necessarily equals.

The relationship between God and the people of Israel was looked upon as a covenant — indeed it was this which constituted the tribes of Israel as a single people. In it, God takes the initiative, with authority, imposing obligations — while at the same time he obliges himself to protect and assist his people:

You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles' wings and brought you to myself. Now therefore, if you will obey my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be my own possession among all the peoples . . ." (1)

In the working out of salvation history, the people of Israel

(1) Exodus 19, 4-5 & 8.

were to enjoy a special place and a unique intimacy with God. In turn, much would be required of them — the election of Israel is an election to responsibility, not merely to a position of privilege. Moreover, it is not forced upon them, but is left to their free choice: "All that the Lord has spoken we will do".⁽¹⁾

From the point of view of our text from the Mass, the original ratification of the Old Covenant is of special importance and must be quoted here in full:

"And Moses rose early in the morning, and built an altar at the foot of the mountain (Sinai), and twelve pillars according to the twelve tribes of Israel. And he sent young men of the people of Israel, who offered burnt offerings and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord. And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins, and half of the blood he threw against the altar. Then he took the book of the covenant, and read it in the hearing of the people; and they said, All that the Lord has spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. And Moses took the blood and threw it upon the people, and said, Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord has made with you in accordance with all these words" ⁽²⁾.

The altar represents God: the blood, sprinkled half upon the altar and half upon the people, thus symbolises their covenant-union. The "book" is of course an anachronism in a desert situation, nor could the code of laws set out in the preceding chapters have existed in this form until about the ninth century before Christ. But we are not presented here with a scientific historical report of the events at Sinai: what we are given is an account of the confrontation of Israel with its God (the basis of all its subsequent history) in the light of later liturgical re-enactment: a re-enactment which made the original event present to the people who took part in it.

We are also told of "two tables of stone, written with the finger of God", which Moses broke when the people wor-

(1) Exodus 19, 4-5 & 8; cf. *Jerome Biblical Commentary*, 3:46 and 77: 74-85.

(2) Exodus 24, 4-8.

shipped the golden calf — symbolising that the covenant had been broken. These tables or (tablets) inscribed with the Ten Commandments, the heart of the covenant law, were afterwards renewed by Moses at God's command, and were kept in the Ark of the Covenant ⁽³⁾ which was thought of as the special place of God's presence with his people.

Alone among Old Testament writers in speaking of a "new covenant", the prophet Jeremiah says that this, in contrast to the old, will be written on men's hearts. In the following chapter, this covenant is called "everlasting", but the word does not appear in the accounts of the Last Supper in the New Testament, though the Epistle to the Hebrews refers to "the blood of the eternal covenant" and it is presumably from here that the word in the Mass is taken. ⁽⁴⁾

Israel was continually being faithless to her promises. The invitation of God to men was always being rejected, until it found complete response in Him who at the same time brought the invitation in fully human terms and made the fullest response to it on behalf of men. It is in the Man Christ Jesus — in his Body offered in perfect love and obedience on the Cross — that the New Covenant consists (Mary, we recall, is spoken of as the Ark of the Covenant). It is the poured-out life of Jesus that is the Blood of this new covenant, as it was the poured-out life of oxen, sprinkled on the altar and on the people, which brought into effect the covenant of Sinai. That covenant, we saw, gave Israel an intimacy with God unique among the nations: this one not only brings about a much more intimate union of life, but is "everlasting" because it is always available: Jesus is "the same yesterday, today, and forever" ⁽⁵⁾. Sacramentally, it is made available in the Eucharist, so that the covenant between God and his people can be daily renewed; and the Eucharist will be celebrated until the end of time, "for as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes" ⁽⁶⁾.

"It will be shed for you and for all men so that sins may

(3) Exodus 31, 18; 32, 19; 34, 27; 40, 20.

(4) Jer. 31, 31-34; 32, 40; Hebrews 13, 20.

(5) Hebrews 13, 8. (6) I Corinthians 11, 26.

be forgiven." This is how the words of consecration in the Mass continue; and "for all men" is a proper translation of the expression that occurs in the account of the Last Supper in Mark and Matthew: "for many" — which meant a great number without restriction. In the third Eucharistic Prayer we pray: "Lord, may this sacrifice, which has made our peace with you, advance the peace and salvation of all the world", and in the fourth: "Remember those who take part in this offering, those here present and all your people, and all who seek you with a sincere heart".

The fact that we are taught to pray like this should lead us to consider what the relationship is between ourselves, who share in the blessings of the New Covenant by faith in Christ, and those who do not. In one sense all men are equal before God: "God shows no partiality, but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him" (7). All men, ourselves included, are sinners (though by faith in Christ we know ourselves to be forgiven sinners); to all men grace is offered through the redeeming death of Christ, and this applies even to those who lived before that saving death. To us this offering of grace comes in a tangible form through the Word of God and the Sacraments. God in Christ is "the Saviour of all men, especially of those who believe" (8).

There is, then, a sense in which all men are *not* equal before God. The New Testament is full of such words as "chosen", "called", "elect", when speaking of the Christian people. To take only one passage at random:

"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing . . . even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him" (9).

But why has God given to some men and women (rather than to many others) the opportunity to come to faith in Jesus Christ, to become members of his Church? (What we

(7) Acts 10, 34; cf. Vatican Council, *Constitution on the Church*, art. 16.

(8) I Timothy 4, 10; cf. Galatians 6, 10.

(9) Ephesians 1, 3-4.

mean by "members of his Church" I discussed in two articles last May and July.) Why, indeed, a Church at all? Could not God have arranged that every one born into the world came to knowledge of Christ?

Without attempting to answer such questions, I can at least point back to the beginning of this article, where we saw that God chose a particular nation (and not a large or important one at that) to play a special part in the history of the world's salvation. With them he made a covenant. They would enjoy special privileges, but they would also have special responsibilities. Too often Israel forgot the latter, while still insisting on the former; so that God could say to them through his prophets:

"You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities" (10). Similar sayings from the New Testament may occur to the reader (11). The point is that God's methods of dealing with mankind do not change. There is still in the world, though formed from all its races and nations, "a chosen race, a holy nation", to quote St. Peter's address to the newly-baptised (12) — "God's own people" who, in the words of the Vatican Council,

"although it does not actually include all men, and may more than once look like a small flock, is nonetheless a lasting and sure seed of unity, hope and salvation for the whole human race. Established by Christ as a fellowship of life, charity and truth, it is also used by him as an instrument for the redemption of all" (13).

Catholics are aware what are their privileges under the New Covenant. What I hope to discuss in our next article is our chief responsibilities, *in so far as these have to do with the redemption of the whole of mankind.*

(10) Amos 3, 2 (11) E.g. Matt. 3, 8-9; 8, 11-12.

(12) I Peter 2, 9; cf. Exodus 19, 5-6. (13) *Constitution on the Church*, art. 9.

On November 3, the United States holds its congressional elections. In 45 states, 6,244 legislative seats will be filled. In this article E. L. Way gives the background to these important elections with particular reference to a ruling of the Supreme Court given on March 26, 1962.

U.S. Elections

E. L. WAY

SOME 6,244 legislative seats in 45 states will be filled on 3 November. This is more than four-fifths of the national total. Amongst these are 1,192 state senatorial seats and 5,052 places in houses of representatives and state assemblies. Since some states choose their lawmakers in odd-numbered years, and amongst these are the remaining five: Virginia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Jersey, none of their seats will be contested this fall.

There has been a great political upheaval in the state legislatures since the Supreme Court ruling of 26 March, 1962 that the judiciary has the power to ensure that the seats in the legislatures are justly allotted to meet the "one-man, one vote" standard. Since the Court's ruling all but 4 of the nation's 99 state legislatures have been reapportioned. And this 'redistricting' will receive fresh impetus from the federal census of 1970 which will continue to have effects in 1971 and 1972. For this reason the results of the elections in November and in 1971 may have important results for the two major political parties. Another factor to be considered is that there are substantially fewer legislators from rural areas than at any time in the history of the nation.

Using the International Calendar

All governments try to use international events to bolster the fortunes of their political parties. Sometimes the over-

lapping of events is the result of a lucky (or unlucky) chance; more often it is the result of good planning. And the Nixon administration hopes that the outcome of these international events will have a favourable domestic political impact on the elections on 3 November.

Amongst these events can be listed: (1) The resumption of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear arms talks (SALT) in Helsinki on 2 November. (2) The government hopes by 15 October to withdraw 50,000 Americans from South Vietnam. Some even forecast that the figure will be hiked to 75,000, thereby demonstrating that the administration has improved on its own projected schedule. (3) The Arab-Israeli ceasefire, if it lasts, was sponsored by the US administration, and is due to run for 90 days: that is up to 5 November. (4) The UN organisation celebrates its 25th anniversary towards the end of October, and there is a prospect of President Nixon meeting the Soviet leaders. (5) In addition the President is to visit Yugoslavia, Spain, England, the southern European headquarters of NATO, and will conduct summit diplomacy with the heads of government visiting Washington. The President certainly has the November election in his sights. He has said that he will concentrate on making the record of his administration "as good as possible . . ." So long as none of these events backfire in his face through inept handling, the political benefits should be important: at least hope will be maintained; and great and not ignoble efforts will have been made.

The Democrats

The Democrats had their origins in the early years of this the greatest republic on earth; and they belong to the oldest political party in existence today. The Party's composition and policies were very greatly influenced by the administrations of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933-45. (A group of 75 historians in 1962 placed him after Lincoln and Washington amongst the five great presidents.) Very briefly, the most important elements of the party today are the South, the working class, including many sections of

organised labour, racial and ethnic minority groups, and most intellectuals. The Republicans are conservative, oppose government programmes, especially in health, education and welfare, and tend to lay stress on private enterprise and individual initiative. They have the support of businessmen, the majority of the professions, most of the middle class and many farmers.

For all the distrust of opinion polls, their findings must still be considered carefully. One Gallup Poll was held in June and another between 31 July and 2 August. The Democratic party had a substantial lead over the Republicans as the party "best able to handle the top problems" of the United States. In the latest results, that I have seen, 1,501 Americans were questioned and amongst this sample the Democrats led the Republicans by 31 per cent to 19 per cent. The gap between the parties had doubled since the survey in June.

Labour

Is labour turning away from the Democrats? George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, thinks that trade unionists are no longer attracted to it as they were in the past. In an interview in early September he bluntly described the party as "in a shamble" without an effective organisation, or a likely candidate for 1972. It's "not so much that our people are looking to the Republicans," he said, "but they are looking less to the Democrats because . . . the party has disintegrated — it is not the so-called liberal party that it was a few years ago. It has almost got to be the party of the extremists insofar as these so-called liberals or new lefts, or whatever you want to call them, have taken over the Democratic party." Meany did add that the Republicans were vulnerable because of continued inflation and rising unemployment. Alexander Barkan, the director of AFL-CIO's Committee on Political education (COPE) stressed that the "proworker balance" in Congress may be in jeopardy. Apathy towards the state-legislature elections in November could be dangerous because "the state legislatures elected

this year will 'redistrict' congressional seats before the 1972 elections." And what is done then will remain in force until after the next census in 1980.

The Hard-Hats

The hard-hats, or blue-collar workers, traditional supporters of the Democratic party may dislike civil-rights militancy, and condemn — sometimes in alarming terms — the careful observance of a criminal's rights; they may detest student nihilism, and beat up protesters and marchers, but they have other legitimate causes for grouching. A study by the assistant labour secretary, Jerome Roson, circulating among campaigning Republicans stresses their plight. Blue-collar workers earn between \$5,000 and \$10,000 a year and face a cruel freeze after their middle earning years. Just when the children have grown up and family expenses are at their peak, these bread-winners (40 per cent of American families) have reached their maximum earning capacity. But the prices still go up, and their only hope is pressure for more wages backed by their unions. "The American working man", the study says "has lost relative class status . . . All blue-collar workers, skilled or not, have been denigrated so badly — so harshly — that their jobs have become a last resort . . . Fathers hesitate — and even apologize for their occupations . . ." (The average income last year was \$3,687 — but here as elsewhere this means little. The average includes the Congressman and the Senator receiving \$42,500 annually and the family in Mississippi without any income at all.)

Unemployment and Strikes

There are 4 million unemployed in America (5 September). And for many it is a traumatically new experience. The Bureau of Labour Statistics estimates that about 400,000 belong to the once eagerly sought after technical, managerial and professional category. This is a 75 per cent increase over the 225,000 jobless in the same group just a year ago. "Almost all these middle-income people earned \$10,000 a

year before they were let go", a bureau spokesman said. Out of work aerodynamicists are writing to Australia for jobs. Scientists and engineers are the worst hit. This is a sure sign of the economic slowdown in America. (Clive Jenkins would surely find something to do there. Ten years ago ASTMS — the Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staff — had 10,000 members. At the end of this year it hopes to have 200,000.)

And in the first six months of this year strike figures were the third highest in 20 years. There were 3,050 work stoppages which resulted in 24 million work days lost. This is what R. H. Tawney would presumably call "autocracy tempered by insurgence". With unemployment, strikes, inflation and economic sluggishness the cards may be stacked against any large Republican inroads into the labour vote at the congressional elections in November.

Galbraithian Analysis

The analysis of the Democratic party in John Kenneth Galbraith's: *Who Needs the Democrats (And What It Takes to Be Needed)*, published this year by Doubleday, is not concerned with electoral victories; and as a result will carry less weight than a feather with the professional politicians. In fact it could do harm to the Democratic cause. Yet it has valid points. He says that the Democratic party "has become a defender of the status quo, a role in which it is incompetent and cannot possibly compete with the Republicans." He quotes Truman who said that "faced with a choice between two conservative parties, the voters will always opt for the real thing." He goes on to say that Democratic economic policy geared to stimulating production is a failure; and that "the economic system does not work". His platform is radical — not a discreet word in American politics — and consists of "taxing the rich, nationalising industries, regulating private enterprise, and limiting consumption." And elsewhere: "The Democratic party must henceforth use the word socialism."

All those in favour of free enterprise, free medicine,

and free malnutrition will be duly put off. But those who have waited, or know people who have, for 8 hours in the County Hospital in Chicago for an examination, and have seen people die while waiting to be examined, may in time to come think differently. "Do you have any money, honey?" is the leading diagnostic question in American medicine, the whole system being structured for businessmen to make money who possess a medical degree. Our own National Health system is a generation in advance. (Just consider paying £400 for a hernia operation.) There is a shortage of 18,000 doctors and 200,000 nurses; and many small towns advertise in vain for a doctor. One may travel 120 miles for a physician.

The Americans are a great and generous people. They have a Constitution which is the admiration of the world. Their continued history will be a slow implementation of this Constitution which has been described as an "admirable document — that has been betrayed by every damned administration since Andy Jackson." The relentless pursuit of betrayed principles is the the only guarantee of progress: the only worthwhile political activity of mankind.

Postscript on U.S. Elections

Amongst the big names of politicians to face the electorate in the fall are: Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D) of Maine—he is tipped to be the Democratic Presidential candidate for 1972. Hubert Humphrey for Minnesota, and Sen. Edward Kennedy for Massachusetts are likely to get good majorities. The 39-year-old Adlai Stevenson III is contesting Illinois. The polls show him to be ahead of the Republican incumbent Sen. Ralph T. Smith. The Republicans must hold the Smith seat if they are to have any chance of making the net gain of seven seats needed to control the Senate.

E.L.W.

CURRENT COMMENT

At a Congress of Theologians held recently in Brussels, Cardinal Suenens gave strong evidence of his own longing for Christian Unity, especially in the closing passages of his inaugural address. Father Crane doubts whether present methods will be effective in speeding up the unity in Britain. In his view, they may retard it. The same accommodating trend applied to religious life is, he believes, responsible for the present dearth of vocations.

Father Crane concludes with some reflections on the naiveté which seemed to characterise the utterances of the Brussels Theologians on the relationship between Church and Society.

Congress in Brussels

THE EDITOR

| READ with interest and, I hope, profit the inaugural address delivered by Cardinal Suenens on September 13th to the fifth Congress of Theologians held this year, under the auspices of *Concilium*, at Brussels. In it, the Cardinal seemed to me to strike a note far less critical of papal authority than in previous public utterances and for this I was truly thankful. There is a time and a place for everything and this is no time for a Prince of the Church to be publicly critical of the Pope to whom he owes special allegiance. Subject to attack as his authority is from so many quarters in the Church, the Holy Father has the right to expect that those, at least, who rank second to himself in the Church's Hierarchy should be particularly mindful of the strong and thoughtful loyalty they owe himself.

Longing for Christian Unity

Be that as it may, my eye was caught particularly by the longing for Christian unity which revealed itself so strongly in the concluding passages of Cardinal Suenens' address in Brussels. We must all be possessed of this longing. What I wonder very seriously, however, is whether the present direct approach to our separated brethren through what some would call concession is going to be as productive of the result we all long for as some "continental" (I can think of no other adjective and it carries no pejorative sense) quarters appear to believe. I have very grave doubts in this regard, my own view being that what might be called the oblique approach of pre-conciliar days to our separated brethren drew members of the Anglican Church in this country much more strongly towards Catholicism than what appears to be the policy of direct concession, at present favoured so strongly in "continental" Catholic circles. I will try to make myself very clear.

Rock-like in Adherence to Truth

Before the second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church, in the eyes of so many Anglicans — to say nothing of post-Christians — stood like a rock in its uncompromising support of God's truth. Seemingly obstinate, indeed to the point of mulishness at times, she appeared doubtless in some quarters as narrow-minded to the point of arrogance. The point, however, is that she stood. It is this I would stress here. And, in so standing, she made the deepest possible impression on thousands and thousands of non-Catholic Christians as well as many thousands more who were not Christians at all. There can be no doubt whatsoever about this. Isolated in her total dedication to truth, unbendable in her allegiance to its imperatives, she drew thousands in this country to herself and, of these, an increasing handful joined the ranks of her Faithful. Her concern, be it noticed, was not directly with those she drew to herself, but with the truth and, thus, indirectly with those who were drawn to her as devoted totally to the truth. This is what I mean by the

oblique or indirect approach, which, in my view, exercised an influence of mounting strength on Anglicans and other non-Catholics in this country up to the time of the second Vatican Council. Rock-like in her adherence to truth, the Church was isolated from yet, at the same time, totally relevant to a world compromised through its increasing attachment to falsehood. Lifted up through her allegiance to truth, as her Founder had been lifted up on the Cross, she drew men, as He did, increasingly to herself. This attitude was expressed at its finest in the person of that great and noble pope, Pius XII. Memories are desperately short. Too many have forgotten today the intensity of the attraction he exercised over so many non-Catholics — Christians and post-Christians alike — in this country in the years after the war and right up to his death. So many of them came to you in those days to speak of the joy they had felt at meeting or even seeing “your Pope”.

Indirect Approach Discarded

This indirect approach to our separated brethren through the radiance that shines out from the splendour of an isolation that comes from total allegiance to the truth, has now been laid aside. It has been discarded at the very moment when it appeared to many of us to be on the point of bearing its finest fruit. I write this without complaint or carping criticism. My endeavour is to present a fact. In its place we have had since the Council the direct approach through concession by way of what *appears* to be (I do not say “is”) accommodation to moral and doctrinal untruth, a less disciplined interpretation of Christian living which *appears* (I do not say “is”) as permissive and a liturgy *apparently* devoid of mystery and majesty. Consequently, the *image*, in the eyes of many Anglicans and non-Christians in this country, is of a Church falling over herself to come to terms with the world. As Malcolm Muggeridge put it so graphically — and I believe he spoke for thousands when he did so—at the very moment when the Catholic citadel seemed utterly firm in its defence against the untruths and

utter banalities of the world, its defenders suddenly emerged waiving white flags; and they have been waving them ever since. At this point, in the eyes of thousands, the rock began to crumble and it has been crumbling ever since. (Notice, please, that I do not say the rock has crumbled or is crumbling; only that it appears to be doing both in the eyes of many non-Catholics and post-Christians in this country).

Set-back for Unity

As a tragic result of this change of approach, many in this country who were once favourably disposed to the Church have turned from it now in disgust and, sometimes, despair. They have lost — and in all probability will never recover — the faith they once had in it as a bastion of truth. The attraction Catholicism had for them until only too recently has now gone. Many who long for the unity of Christendom as earnestly as the Belgian Cardinal are now convinced that, so far as the Church of England is concerned, the cause of unity has not been brought nearer, but rendered far more remote by what I have called the direct concessionary approach of post-conciliar years.

I have no hesitation in saying, with great regard for those who think otherwise, that I am one of many in this country (I believe myself the enormous majority of Catholics) who think in this fashion and I would most certainly resent the imputation that, because I do, I am opposed to Christian unity. On the contrary, I am totally for it and do not see how any Catholic worthy of the name can be anything else. At the same time, I am convinced that the basis of unity must be shown to my Anglican brethren in terms of an uncompromising and, indeed, rigid adherence to truth.

Fall-off in Converts

I find it no mere coincidence, therefore, that, at this time of what I have called the direct concessionary approach to the Anglican Church, there should have been a falling-

off in the number of converts to Catholicism. The trend, I think, will gather pace and the reason lies in this, that what constituted for so many the motives that made the Catholic Church credible in their eyes — her steadfast adherence to the truth and uncompromising confrontation with the world—now *appear* to them to have been weakened as a result of the recent change of approach so sincerely adopted by those anxious, above all, to achieve reunion without delay. Here you have, at one and the same time, the tragedy and the irony of the present situation. But the tragedy, at least, does not end here. The confusion produced in the minds of the Faithful by zealous endeavours to introduce what I have called the concessionary approach into the Church have raised doubts in the minds of many Catholics and, in some cases, knocked away the struts that supported their Faith. Neither is there anything weak in the need for struts. Creatures as we are of body as well as soul, the social factor is of great importance in our lives and, when this is riven with confusion so that the solidity of its support round us is broken, the Faith of an individual, in the same way as his human life, can be brought to a point where it can no longer be supported on its own. Social isolation can drive a man to madness or suicide; by the same count, spiritual isolation can drive him out of the Church. This, I believe, has been the fate of some Catholics in recent years. Deprived, as they now think, of the certainties they once had in an uncertain world, robbed of the familiar things of their spiritual home, no longer members of a united family, they have stumbled despairing into the night. It is easy to classify such action as weakness. I do not think the charge is fair.

Progressives and Religious Orders

It has been the same with religious orders and congregations these past few years. In the first flush of what they have thought of somewhat superficially as a post-conciliar liberation, the progressive outlook has first gained ground within them, then power; and swept away rules,

traditions, customs and, in some cases, a whole way of life hallowed by the years. Those who wept amongst the wreckage have been brushed aside; within months sometimes the whole framework of their lives has been shattered, often without warrant and by a few whose sole claim to wisdom has been made to lie in their absence of years. These have turned the old into fodder for change. Unable to stand it any longer, the props of years gone from their lives, some of these elderly religious have gone into a wilderness not of their making, friendless, with tears in their eyes. Men and women faithful to God for years, still faithful; but unable any more to endure the nightmare conditions thrust on them by their young, liberal-minded brethren in the name of progress.

Permissiveness and Vocations

And, of course, if one looks for the cause of the present dearth of vocations — and God alone knows how serious it is — it is to be found, surely, in the same cause. Religious orders whose members confuse progress with progressivism and renewal with a relaxation of standards will get no worthwhile vocations to their ranks and most certainly deserve none. Their misunderstanding of modern youth — often to the point of insult — is evidenced by the fact that never before, perhaps, have so many religious orders combined so marked a disinclination for prayer with so manifest a desire to tout for vocations in terms of a life that is rated as “interesting” and “modern”; and barely disguised in so many cases as “permissive”. Religious who think and advertise in these terms do not deserve vocations, neither will they get them. All their advertising reveals is the poverty of their spiritual state and the remoteness of their thinking from that latent idealism of modern youth which can be touched only in terms of that prayerful dedication which is so alien now to a great deal of religious life. Religious who think in these permissive and puny terms would do well to take careful note of the battle order put out by General Giap to his young peasant troops — Communist and non-

Communist alike — before their final assault on the French stronghold of Dien Bien-Phu in what was then called Indo-China. It went like this:

"You will almost certainly die. Already, even to get within gun range, you have to clamber and slither over men's rotting bodies, the bodies of your own comrades. The probability is that you will die, just as they have done. If you do, you will not just be dying in the fight against French colonialism. You will not just be dying for Vietnam. You will be dying for suffering, oppressed humanity all over the world. Your death will help to make the world a better place".

"Naught for Your Comfort"

A modern version of Chesterton's "I give you naught for your comfort, naught for your desire". Just that. Not "all mod. cons. and an easy life", not modernity. No, just "naught for your comfort". Just that, and with total sincerity. When the best of the young recognise this in a religious order, they will flock to it; when they recognise it in the Church, they will flock to it. Otherwise they will not. It is otherwise at the moment and this is why they will not. Yet, rather than face the simple but sacrificial issue of their deficiency in essentials, religious orders today are concentrating, in their eagerness for vocations, on the trivial complexities of accidentals. What matters, they let themselves think, is the hem-line of a sister's habit or the length of a seminarian's hair; whether she can try for a driving licence or he work for a year in a factory. Rubbish! What matters, in essence, is that the knees of both be worn with prayer. Until this is seen straight and clear, religious life in this country will continue to crumble through lack of recruits; and, for this, it will have only itself to blame.

Language and "Representative" Catholics

If I may go back for a moment to the theologians at Brussels, I would make the point that the resolutions voted

on at their Congress were couched in a type of language almost certain to obscure their meaning from the generality of Catholics. This is in no way a criticism and I am referring only to the English translation. There is no reason whatsoever why theologians, as well as any other scientific men, should not communicate in a kind of language understood clearly only by themselves. It would be tyranny, indeed, to compel them to do otherwise. All I wonder at here is whether, in phrasing their resolutions as they did, they were conscious of the obscurity of the language employed, so far as the generality of us are concerned. If they were so conscious and intended the resolutions only for themselves, then all is well. If they were not so conscious and thought of their resolutions as understood by the generality of Catholics, then there exists between them and the rest of us a communications gap of considerable magnitude and there is trouble storing up for the future. For the few who *do* understand the theologians may well claim to be and be thought of by the theologians as representative of the Catholic body as a whole, as speaking for it in the same way that some — away out from it, out of touch with it — are thought of as speaking for the Catholic body today when, in reality, they are speaking rather louder than most and only for themselves. The theologians, in consequence, are likely to be gravely misled as to the doctrinal and moral points that need emphasis today and the direction in which their attempts to give doctrine practical expression should be set.

There is a hint of the kind of confusion that could arise in the recommendation of the Seventh Resolution of the Brussels Conference that Christian communities should "take a position in favour of freedom in the various societies of which they form a part". This recommendation, of course, is not at issue as a general principle, but improperly understood could give the Church the strangest bed-fellows, whilst ill-timed action arising from it could easily produce no more than greatly increased chaos and oppression.

Protest and Injustice

It is fashionable today in some quarters of the Church—largely progressive—where strategic thinking is not at a very advanced level, to demand that action be taken irrespective of the cost, to remedy a situation that has arisen largely through failure of the Church to exercise adequate foresight or take appropriate forestalling action a good many years before. The Church is blamed *now* for not bearing witness against an unjust situation which may have been allowed to arise through lack of adequate anticipatory action in the past; the impression is given that reparation must be made now and through only one type of action for previous omissions and the thought conveyed is that this must be done even though the type of action imperatively enjoined will result, if taken, in many men and women — Catholic and otherwise — being set at far greater disadvantage than was ever the case before. There is no logic in this type of argument, which can bring great disaster in its train if given practical effect. There are more ways than one of combatting injustice. To tie the Church to one — with the strong implication that only thus can she make reparation for the past—seems to me not only arrogant, but illogical and naive.

Yet, there was a hint in the tone of some of the speeches at the Congress, as well as the resolution I have referred to above, that a good many of the theologians had in mind open protest, irrespective of the cost, as the only significant kind of reaction demanded of the Church by the many unjust situations which confront men today. Apart from what appears to me as the wholly disproportionate cost that would often have to be paid for the universal adoption of a stance of this sort in face of injustice, it does seem to me that the theologians have given far too little thought to the part the Christian layman is called upon to play in the contemporary world in the struggle against injustice. It is a little naive to see the favourable resolution of that struggle in terms only of thundering anathemas from the institutional Church, whilst forgetting the long-term task well-trained

lay elites have to play in restoring justice and decency to society. There is, it seems to me, more than a whiff of paternalism in the way so many theologians lay on the organised church the burden of combatting injustice that ought to be consigned to well-trained young laymen.

So Few Priests to Train the Laymen

The trouble is there are so few to train them. There are plenty of young priests today who are prepared to tell the Church her business and to chide her somewhat stupidly for the mistakes of the past. But there are so few, so very few who are ready for the quiet, patient and, often, very tiring work — done, as a rule, in one's spare time and with no publicity at all — of giving the lay few the dedication, the knowledge of Christian principles and the grasp of strategy necessary to enable them to tackle social injustice and bring a sense of dignity to their environment. I am not asking the theologians to do this because I do not see that it is their task to do so; but I do ask them to take notice that this task needs to be done. What I would point out to them here, with great respect, is that it is the layman's task to change the face of contemporary society and that it is practically impossible to find today priests who are willing to assist or, indeed, allow him to do it. Instead, too many clerics, especially the younger ones, are attacking society themselves in a way that is outrageously naive; involving themselves, disguised in lay attire, in fields that belong properly to laymen. They give the appearance of wanting to lead in these fields; of shedding their clerical collars to secure a following, say, on the factory floor or within rural communities. Is not this, however, no more than a new, slightly more subtle expression of that very old-time paternalism, which they themselves affect to despise? Cannot these young priests learn to stand aside and give the young Catholic layman his rightful place, serving unostentatiously — through the patient help they can give him — his need to influence the existing social order?

Congress at Lausanne

CATHERINE DANIEL

FOR THE last seven years around Easter time at Lausanne in Switzerland a European Congress has met under the auspices of an International Office, which exists to disseminate Catholic Social Teaching and apply it to ideals of citizenship based upon acknowledgement of the Natural Law as a basis for Christian action in society. The theme discussed this year was that of "Fatherland, Nation and State" as contrasted with totalitarianism, considered as a modern phenomenon linked almost inevitably with an industrial economy. Seven lecturers of international standing spoke of this main theme from richly varied standpoints.

Lectures were interspersed with the work of twenty-three study groups at which the main lecture themes were broken down into subsidiary themes for more detailed study; such as, for example, action in the family, problems of teaching, education in universities, Marxism and university life, health and medicine from the angle of a national health service, country life, business management, trade unions, and so on. These and other topics were discussed within groups whose personnel were drawn from the Conference's four thousand members, many of them university students. The topics themselves were discussed within the context of the nation and directed towards the dominant theme of the Conference itself, which was that the very survival of Christian civilization in this industrial-totalitarian-technological age depended on the survival of Christian nationhood.

Speaking on "The Vocation of the Nation in God's Design", Marcel Clement told us that the significance of the nation lay not so much in what she experienced in her temporal situation, but, rather, in what God intended for her in her supernatural destiny, with the life of each nation

reflecting one or more of the activities of God himself. In this, perhaps Platonic, strain, he indicated France's destiny as being always to convey the "living matter" of the Church to the nations; that of Italy as a feminine role, mothering the Church; of Spain as shrouded in mystery, thereby to illuminate the perennial virtue of chastity as somehow always allied to spiritual poverty, which is necessary to throw it into relief.

All such elements are part of the nation's creative life under grace and Marcel Corte of Liege University set out in his address to establish the nation as the natural organism, which contains in itself the seeds of cultural and, to the highest degree, religious survival. For here in the nation is the natural basis on which grace builds the kind of human society wherein mankind can and must conserve and nourish the liberating forces which alone can counteract the all-embracing and savage grip of the totalitarian ethos. Corte described the totalitarian State as mighty only in the massive sum-total of its weaknesses, forcing its tentacles into every corner of man's being.

Until now, men have been able to survive the creeping barrage of this kind of oppression through the stimulus provided by material and economic progress. But now, however, the final shape of tyranny is becoming more clearly defined. Nevertheless, totalitarianism itself is doomed in the longer run because it subverts human nature itself and all that betrays nature is doomed in the end to destruction. Starting from this axiom, therefore, mankind must examine the maladies attendant on deracinization — the break with tradition at every level, the loss of any sense of significance of the created world about us as the good and holy work of a beneficent God, the growing unconsciousness of the need for social hierarchy and well-ordered values as entitled to claim man's loyalties within the orbit of nationhood itself. The loss of these brings a vacuum, which is filled — or whose filling is attempted — by the fiction of the super-State or the subhuman universalism of Marxism itself. In this context, Professor

Willemsen of Berlin spoke with passionate remorse of the demonic rule of Nazism, which he described as a satanic aberration from the path mapped out by men by intellect united in with natural order.

On the Celtic issue, Hamish Fraser of Scotland dealt with the complex question of national freedoms within the boundaries of one State. Under favourable conditions, national minorities could achieve realization of their own values by co-operating within the framework set by the same State. Something of this kind is seen, indeed, in Switzerland where different ethnic entities, whilst divided linguistically, partake of the unity of true nationhood.

Several speakers warned the Congress of the revolutionary activities of international and widely spread subversives who, by polarizing ethnic and linguistic differences amongst men, foment the breakdown of the society of the nation in an effort to subvert all civilized values. Christianity, on the other hand, recognises and rejoices in diversity within true unity: these varied differences are harmonized within the larger dimension of Christ. A final lecture by Jean Ousset, President of the International Office, drew together all these themes. He gave the Congress a masterly synthesis of the type of activity which believers must undertake if they want to save the nation as a base of civilization. Jean Ousset has been tireless in his exposition of the dangers of those revolutionary activities which now more than ever before threaten not merely all order, but its Christian basis itself. He insists that, where the forces of revolution prepare their attack through the intensified activity of cadres highly trained in systematic subversion, so must we promote the formation of Christian cadres trained to provide the counter-thrust at every level of attack. For this, a degree of unity is indispensable in the life of nations. The strong definition and upholding of certain essentials of the Natural Law of God is the condition of this unity.

The Congress showed me a cross-section of Christian Europeans aware of the conditions under which religion can survive in today's world. Its members drew their strength,

so full of spirit, from Mass each day and the daily recitation of the Rosary. On the final day, Low Sunday, Cardinal Lefebvre sang the Tridentine Mass and the ageless response sung in Latin by the vast congregation sounded newer and strangely younger as they came flowing out again, fresh from their long sequestration.

I learnt at the Congress that the International Office finds the empirical outlook of the English something of an impediment to the serious discussion of Christian social ideas. This is a serious disability particularly, perhaps, at a university level where, often today, one might think that the only social ideals worth looking at are an amalgam of Marx/Lenin/Trotsky/Mao, with a bit of Che thrown in. But ideas are powers for good or evil and, one way or another, they take on flesh and become incarnate, so to say in the struggles of humanity. For a Welsh woman like myself, accustomed to the status of minority nationhood and with the survival of my own nation a constant preoccupation, it was a strengthening experience at the Lausanne Congress to find that the fulfilment of national hopes is a condition of religious and social survival. The defensive position to which I myself am committed appeared at the Congress as identified with and part of the defensive strategy of all Christian Europe. Christian nationhood was seen to be the crux of Christian civilization today as it has always been since the time long ago when Moses led the children of Israel out of bondage to prepare for the incarnation of all our liberties in Christ.

Rules for Revolution

ON a dark night in May, 1919, two lorries rumbled across a bridge and on into the town of Dusseldorf. Among the dozen rowdy, singing "Tommyes", apparently headed for a gay evening, were two representatives of the Allied military intelligence. These men had traced a wave of indiscipline, mutiny and murder among the troops to the local headquarters of a revolutionary organisation established in the town.

Pretending to be drunk, they brushed by the sentries and surprised the ringleaders—a group of thirteen men and women seated at a long table. They arrested them and took them behind the lines where they were dealt with according to military law.

In the course of the raid the Allied officers emptied the contents of the safe. One of the documents found in it contained a specific outline of “Rules for Bringing About Revolution”. It is reprinted here to show the strategy of materialistic revolution, and how personal attitudes and habits of living affect the affairs of nations:

- A. Corrupt the young. Get them away from religion. Get them interested in sex. Make them superficial, destroy their ruggedness.
- B. Get control of all means of publicity and thereby:
 - 1. Get people’s minds off their governments by focussing their attention on athletics, sexy books and plays and other trivialities.
 - 2. Divide the people into hostile groups by constantly harping on controversial matters of no importance.
 - 3. Destroy the people’s faith in their natural leaders by holding the latter up to ridicule, obloquy and contempt.
 - 4. Always preach true democracy, but seize power as fast and as ruthlessly as possible.
 - 5. By encouraging government extravagance, destroy its credit, produce fear of inflation with rising prices and general discontent. Foment unnecessary strikes in vital industries, encourage civil disorders and foster a lenient and soft attitude on the part of government toward such disorders.
 - 6. By specious argument cause the break-down of the old moral virtues: Honesty, sobriety, continence, faith in the pledged word, ruggedness.
- C. Cause the registration of all firearms on some pretext with a view to confiscating them and leaving the population helpless.

Today, according to Henry Edwards, there is a Newman myth, cultivated by Newmanniacs who have taken the great Cardinal to themselves and made him something he never was. The image-makers have been at work on his memory, endowing him with a likeness to contemporary progressive Catholics which was never his; making him the patron of a liberal theology which, in his own day, he repudiated.

Newman and the Newmanniacs

HENRY EDWARDS

A YEAR or two before the second world war I came upon a book made up of essays done by Marxists of various sects upon Dean Swift, who, they all declared, was a proto-Marxist. In my Tory innocence I thought he was among that illustrious little band of radical Tories to which I then tended to adhere. No doubt many a reader may find some other example, e.g. Oliver Cromwell, whose memory is strangely cherished by parliamentarians and, nowadays, Dr. Martin Luther by a variety of "leading" Catholics.

A Venerated Name

But perhaps the strangest example is provided by John Henry Newman, simple priest and cardinal. In my very rare charitable moments I think it perhaps not so bad that Catholics who seem to me uncommonly cranky cherish Newman as if he were their patron saint. That so many Dutch and Flemings regard him with veneration seems almost a solecism when they have at Ghent in Antwerp province a cult that reminds me of St. Dymphna, who

migrated from Ireland thence and who is invoked in the prayers for the insane.

It happens that I also venerate the name of Newman. I was carefully brought up to execrate it and, though I am often told my opinions and much else are similar to those my father held so tenaciously, I must record that I failed together to maintain the "stout and sensible" anti-Newman attitude my father taught me. Even so, for many years I believed with my father that Newman was a rascal who was rightly rebuked by Kingsley. I copied my father who would always sit glowering in some place of worship where "Praise to the Holiest in the Height" was sung. I still dislike "Lead, Kindly Light", though not for my father's reason. I suspect my dislike has to do with my knowledge that the hymn is popular at spiritualistic séances. On the other hand, I refused to follow my father's championing of a counterblast hymn by Laura Ormiston Chant:

"Light of the world, faint were our weary feet
With wandering far".

That kind of hymn is necessarily polemical. And then it is far too sanguine, reminding me of that satirical verse that pointed to the fatuous optimism of Liberals who disliked that lovely evangelical hymn; "Just as I am, without one plea, but that thy Blood was shed for me".

The Term "Liberal"

My first and tentative introduction to Newman's writings came about when I was reading what some may call the counter-revolutionaries starting, say, with Burke and including Coleridge, de Maistre and Bonald, the Schlegels and Novalis. I was to become aware of Newman's solid ground work in this. I was encouraged in such studies by Mr. G. M. Young who suggested my writing a little book on the young Disraeli, which may be regarded as a by-product of such reading in the course of which I not only never supposed Newman to be the proto-Liberal he is now believed to be but to have been a philosophic enemy of Liberalism.

Alas, the term "liberal" is, as I have mentioned in an earlier article in *Christian Order*, both emotive and ambiguous. If by a Liberal we mean someone of a liberal education (*disciplina mollis*) or someone of a truly liberal mind in the old classic sense that suggests manners and address, roominess and generosity, then Newman was certainly a Liberal. I should like to be called a Liberal in this sense.

Newman and Liberalism

But a Liberal in that sense is no easy companion for a Liberal in the more generally accepted sense. The former may never have heard of Liberalism, a word which Newman associated with what he deemed repulsive. Those who have read no more than his *Apologia*, must have spotted the several references in it to his dislike of Liberalism; the theological Liberalism which stems from philosophic Liberalism. I select here but one reference:

"Some years earlier he (Mr. Hugh Rose whose reputation Newman confirmed) had been the first to give warning. I think from the university pulpit in Cambridge, of the perils to England which lay in the biblical and theological speculations of Germany. The Reform agitation followed and the Whig government came into power; and he anticipated in their distribution of church patronage the authoritative introduction of liberal opinions into the country: by 'Liberal' I mean Liberalism in religion, for questions of politics, as such, do not come into this narrative at all. He feared that by the Whig Party a door would be opened to the most grievous of heresies."

That paragraph is bee-bread. A Cambridge pulpit; and today we have the fashionable Cambridge new theology. The nineteenth century German theologians; and today we suffer

— Catholics as well as Protestants — from the speculation of Bonhoeffer, Tillich and Bultmann. The advent of "reform" and a philosophical Liberalism behind political Liberalism; and today a new reformism besets us, backed by yet another species of philosophical Liberalism which

me may regard as anarchism (vide Marcuse). "The most heinous of heresies"; even in the Catholic Church the faithful are plagued by them and, *mirabile dictu*, by heretics who dare say that Newman is their spiritual father. But perhaps the most ominous sentence has to do with what Newman called "the authoritative introduction of liberal opinions" which went with (Anglican) church patronage. I have been accused of attempting a naughty paradox — the liberality of Liberals; but here is Newman himself calling attention to a specious authoritarianism backed by church patronage — of "liberal opinions". And I am by no means the only ordinary Catholic to think that we have already a virtual censorship that makes it practically impossible for anyone to put this particular point of view before the Catholic reader. If I am wrong, perhaps some liberal editor may spare me some space.

Newman Myth

That a band of Catholics, who perform for the Catholic Church the part which *le pays légal* performs for the liberal democracy, has taken Newman to its corporate heart despite all I have mentioned (and what is to follow) may puzzle those who may not have noticed Newman's own work, *The Grammar of Assent*. Newman therein considered the manner in which a mass of assorted information filters through, so to speak, the human mind, which at length produces its "myth". Years later Sorel conceded that he had used Newman's myth to construct his own revolutionary myth. I do no more here than suggest that there is a Newman myth, which arrived partly by the way in which so many of us read the past in terms of the present. On that scheme of things St. Augustine was a Calvinist or a Jansenist. But it is well-nigh intolerable to have to listen to such *obiter dicta* as, "if Newman were with us today, he would be in the liberal van". Perhaps what chiefly irks me is that the kind of people who talk like this are so extraordinarily well-meaning and sometimes even clever.

Newman and Catholic Progressives

What is it, then, in Newman which attracts them? (And if they may not have already asked, "what is it in Newman that attracts Edwards?") Hilda Graef gives some answers: there was his being "under a cloud" (compare some of our Progressives who now bask in the sun); there was his alleged interest in freeing religion from "inessential accretions of past centuries unacceptable to modern man" (though he was convinced of the miracle of the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius); there was his supposed capacity for "dialogue". But Hilda Graef is herself under the spell of the myth for she writes; "After his death his principles were once more rejected and after the Modernist controversy the clock was put back again (putting back the clock is one of the clichés of modernists)". Principles? I find that among them he insisted upon "the principle of dogma". "My battle was with Liberalism. I mean the anti-dogmatic principle and its developments". How does that square with the words of Loisy, Péro Hyacinthe and Tyrrell?

On the other hand, Hilda Graef is probably right when she compares him with Søren Kierkegaard and Pascal, though who among the Progressives is going to adopt Marcel Blaise? The vogue for Existentialism, which may still be discerned, allows for the interest in such men and, I should suppose, in St. Augustine of Hippo. I dare not discuss whether there is an existential side to the philosophy of St. Thomas (I never understood him at all well); but I have heard it said that there was such a side. At the same time I believe there is a certain retreat from the once dominant Thomism — probably for poor reasons, e.g. that his was a dry theology and a too intellectualist philosophy (a remark that seems as if Aquinas is being mistaken for Cajetan). Newman's progressive admirers had they taken due account of his debt to the non-Latin traditions of the Catholic Church — to men like St. John Chrysostom and the Alexandrians — and been aware of the similarity of Newman's mood to that of Vladimir Soloviev. From that point

of view, Newman may well have aided that dialogue, which is not so much between Catholics and Protestants or between Romanists and dissident Byzantines as between the Latin and the non-Latin traditions.

Newman, Manning and Conversion

There is an apocryphal conversation between Newman and Manning on the subject of conversions. Manning, a redoubtable convert-maker, is supposed to have asked Newman how many converts he had made. Newman replied, "None". Now that answer is felt by too many of Newman's admirers to contain an ecumenical promise. That Newman toiled as a sower; that he wanted with the help of God to prepare the way for a great harvest is one thing. It is quite another when Newmanniacs continue to act as if they had a warrant from Newman to act as he acted — to continue preparing the ground. In fact they are not preparing the ground. I happened to be ecumenical years before ecumenism became either a craze or a method of deferring the preaching of the Faith. I may even have bored people both Catholics and Protestants by my interest in Ann Griffiths of Dolwar (a Calvinist) and my love of the *hwyl* in a Welsh chapel sermon of the old school. I am a constant reader of most of Bunyan's works. I have even read among the pages of Karl Barth to profit withal. I recall the days when most of my Catholic friends looked askance at my ecumenical interests. Have I then retreated while my Catholic friends — most of them cradle Catholics — have suddenly decided to advance? Not so. I always kept a certain reserve; and in the new air it seems that too many act as if ecumenism really amounted to indifferentism. Ecumenism of this sort has nothing to do with Newman's soil-tilling. The Preacher tells us that there is a time to plant, but now the return to the Catholic Church is no nearer, it appears, than the Greek Calends. And far too many ecumenists seem pleased.

Newman and the Image-Makers

In one of my more cynical moods I once suggested that

the latest craze for iconoclasm — taking all the statues out of church — was by way of getting enough space to put up a great statue of Newman, a Newman made in the image of Newmanniacs. But this is to prepare for idolatry; and there is idolatry in all this interest in “images”. I am very tired of the journalistic talk about “the image” of such-and-such. Nowadays no one seems to be allowed to consider politics in terms of doctrine but only in terms of “images” and the same may well be true of more important matters. It is certainly a travesty of Newman’s illative sense, that faculty which, as both Pascal and Newman held, enables us to know without the use of syllogisms. This “image” business may be said to be a trick of journalists which persuades people to believe by trickery; trickery that goes under many a modern alias.

This Newmanniac image has a great aphorism above its head — one of Newman’s. “To be perfect is to have changed often”. But it will not have as a complement Newman’s words:

“Dislike of change is not only the characteristic of a virtuous mind but is in some sense a virtue itself”. If by change were meant what Newman meant by development, the matter would stand differently; but Newman could also write: “From the time that I became a Catholic of course I have no further history of my religious opinions to relate . . . I have no changes to record”.

In other respects the Newmanniac image is idolatrous in that it reflects the mind of the worshippers rather than that of Newman. For example, Newman gloried in clerical celibacy; he liked pious bric-a-brac, disapproved of good novels as Pascal disapproved of a virtuous play, and saw dangers in education. In this last it is true that Newman parted company from St. Bernard. Newman devoted an entire lecture to make the case that knowledge is its own end and that this end, intellectual culture, is the proper scope of a liberal education. It may be that he had in mind the direct intrinsic end of knowledge (*finis operis*) while Bernard had in mind the extrinsic mediate end (*finis*

operantis). Of course, knowledge is not essentially ordered towards piety; but we may raise (with the aid of God) the mediate extrinsic end higher. And if a liberal education ceases to be liberal when directed to ends higher than the merely human, we may well do without it.

Horizontal and Vertical

The most serious and most radical difference between Newman and the Newmaniacs is to be found in one of Newman's most often quoted sayings. I mean, of course, his "two luminous thoughts", God and his soul. As one who has had to take an interest in the politics of my nation, I shall hardly be accused of a one-sided verticalism; but I have ever been aware of the need to correct our fashionable, one-sided horizontalism that puts "fellowship" in place of adoration. The Newmaniacs of our time rashly over-emphasise the horizontal. Cardinal Manning would, I should have supposed, have suited their politicisings better. Now there was a Prince of the Church for them: he would defend the dockers, he took part in "causes" including anti-vivisection and total abstinence, and was a very "social" Christian leader. In comparison Newman seemed quite aloof.

And then, of course, great as my own regard is for Newman, I know I must not read his works as if they were those of some Father of the Church. Since so many of the early Fathers erred in some matter (the list is quite large), *a fortiori* we should be most careful not to use Newman as some of my Evangelical friends use the Bible. And this is being fair to Newman.

Is a man under an obligation to join a trade union? How far can strikes go in upholding the rights of trade unionists? What is the present law on the rights of trade unions? Dr. Jackson asks and answers these and other questions in this article.

Trade Union Rights and Obligations

J. M. JACKSON

AT the time of writing (August) two events make it worthwhile taking another look at the rights and obligations of trade unions. It looks as if the Dock Strike has been settled, although with a couple of days to go before the return to work the situation is not absolutely clear. Secondly, the Court of Appeal has considered an appeal by one of the printing unions, Sogat, against the amount of damages in a case where a member was wrongfully expelled, and whilst reducing the amount of damages made certain comments which seem to imply that the Courts may be prepared to impose more severe restrictions on the right of the trade unions to impose a closed shop.

Few people now would deny the right of workers to form trade unions in order to negotiate with their employers on reasonably equal terms and to protect their legitimate interests. Such a right of association cannot, however, be unlimited. Other people have rights too, and there is no justification for placing the trade unions above the law. There may be many difficulties in placing particular kinds of restriction on trade unions, but this does not alter the fact that the trade unions are under a moral obligation to have due regard to the rights of employers, to the rights of third

parties, and to the rights of the community at large. The trade unions cannot complain if laws are passed which seek to impose limitations on their freedom of action.

The Present Law

The position since 1906 has been that the trade unions have been given virtually complete immunity at law for their wrongful actions. Admittedly, the liability of individual members and officials is greater than that of the trade unions themselves, though even this is not unlimited where a trade dispute is involved.

The critical issue for a trade union is that they should not be liable for damages if they call their members out on strike in breach of their contracts of employment. In 1906, there was no doubt a case for giving the unions immunity for this particular type of wrongful action. Under modern conditions, it is arguable that the trade unions do not need the right to call a strike which involves a breach of contract, and that their ability to protect the living standards of their members would not be undermined if the unions were only permitted to call a strike after an appropriate period of notice* What is certain is that there is no need to give a trade union immunity from legal proceedings for all types of wrongful acts. Why, for example, should a trade union be immune from being sued for a libel published in its journal? Why, in this case should the only remedy be an action against the editor and/or the author and not the publisher? There is the danger that neither the author nor the editor will be in a position to pay damages, and the plaintiff may find himself having to meet a substantial bill for his costs. Indeed, there is a possibility that if the libel were published during a trade dispute and could be deemed

* It has sometimes been suggested that notice of a strike is not in fact notice to terminate the individual worker's contract of employment, and that strike notice would not necessarily give immunity from proceedings for inducing a breach of contract. This point is debatable, but it is really unimportant. There is no reason why the collective bargain should not specify that the individual contracts of employment should incorporate the right to strike provided the appropriate notice is given—possibly limiting this right to those situations where specified procedures for a settlement have first been used.

relevant to it, then even the author and editor might enjoy immunity from legal proceedings.*

The first step, therefore, should be to modify the existing immunity given to trade unions and to members and officials. Unions and their members should be subject to the same laws as other individuals and associations with the possible exception of acts relating directly to the calling of a strike in circumstances where a breach of contract might be involved.

The Community and Third Parties

Where unions have a just cause, they have the right to call a strike. The right of workers, in defence of their legitimate interests, to withdraw their labour is an important freedom in a democratic society. The unions do not, however, have any right to try and make their strike action more effective by denying alternative goods and services to those who may be hurt by the stoppage. There have been instances, for example, during bus strikes of attempts to interfere with private motorists giving lifts to members of the public. This is a deliberate attempt to injure innocent persons and can never be morally justified: the end does not justify the means.

Even if the strikers have a good case, the right to take strike action must be limited. Workers do not have the right to take action even in support of a legitimate claim if the consequences of their action is out of all proportion to the damage that will ensue. This is an important consideration in such matters as the recent Dock Strike.

At present, it is difficult to estimate the precise consequences for the economy. During the strike, both imports and exports have been held up, and thus there has been little or no immediate impact on the balance of payments. As time goes on, however, there is likely to be some adverse impact on the balance of payments, possibly a serious one.

* This would seem a possibility to a layman, and even the obvious interpretation of the existing legislation. However, it could well be an interpretation that the judges would not accept willingly, and they might well go to considerable lengths to find a way of extending some protection to an injured party if such a case were to come before them.

Imports that have been held up by the strike will come in later, but exports that have been held up by the strike may be lost for ever. Moreover, it may not be only the goods which would have been exported during the period of the strike which are lost. Importers in foreign countries who turned to other sources of supply during the strike may stick to those sources, with the result that there is a continuing loss of exports. It may be that the strike was not sufficiently prolonged to have a serious effect of this kind, the consequences could have been very damaging for the economy if the strike had been prolonged.

In the event, the Court of Inquiry quickly produced a report which provided the basis of settlement. There is, however, no doubt that if the unions had not found the Court's proposals acceptable, they would have been prepared to prolong the strike indefinitely. Two points can be made, therefore. First, it would have been far more sensible to have submitted the dispute to arbitration and to have reached the same kind of settlement without the stoppage which did in fact occur. There is no reason why the dispute should not have been referred to an arbitration tribunal composed of men of equal standing to those on the Court of Inquiry. Secondly, it would seem that the unions might have been prepared to prolong the Dock Strike in a manner that would have been disastrous for the economy. If the strike had lasted a month or six weeks, the result might have been a balance of payments crisis, a severely deflationary budget (perhaps before April), sharply rising unemployment, devaluation and a general fall in living standards throughout the country.* Even a legitimate grievance does not justify a trade union in risking such consequences for the nation as a whole.

Many trade unionists may dispute this line of argument, but this is typical of the unionists' attempt to put themselves and the trade unions above the law. It is a proposal that is generally accepted in other spheres. The law, for example,

* It is still too early to say that some of these consequences will not follow the strike. All that can be said is that if it had been prolonged, most of them would certainly have ensued.

recognises the right of the citizen to take the life of an armed intruder in self-defence. It does not recognise the right to kill somebody who is trespassing on one's property but who is not doing serious damage or threatening one's own safety, *even though there may be no other effective remedy open to the citizen*. The trade unions have no right to wreck the country's economy, even if some workers are suffering an injustice, especially if there is a remedy such as arbitration available.

The Closed Shop

The case of *Edwards v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades* does not add particularly to the law relating to the closed shop. It has long been established that a trade union is liable in damages if a member suffers loss through wrongful expulsion. In this particular case, Edwards was deemed by the union to have lapsed automatically because he fell more than six weeks in arrears with his subscriptions, even though this was the fault of the union branch which failed to send to the employer Edwards's authorisation for the employer to deduct union subscriptions from his wages. What the Court of Appeal did make clear was that in a case where there is a closed shop and loss of a union card will mean a man can no longer follow his usual means of livelihood, arbitrary behaviour will not be tolerated. The union rules must be followed, but that alone is not enough. In this case, the rules provided for automatic termination of temporary membership where the member fell into arrears. The rules did not say that expulsion would only occur if the arrears were the member's own fault or that he should be given an opportunity to be heard before he was expelled. The Court's judgment means that the union rules must also conform to certain standards of acceptability. If the rules purport to give the union arbitrary rights to expel a member or to expel him without giving him a chance to answer any complaint against him, such rules will be regarded by the Courts as invalid and the member will still be given the protection of the Courts.

Welcome as this clarification of the law may be, it does not go far enough. A number of questions remain to be answered. Is a man under an obligation to join a trade union? Does it follow that rules which the Courts would accept as reasonable provide an adequate safeguard?

The unions dislike the 'free rider'. They resent the fact that the non-member may benefit from the activities of the union without making any contribution to their cost. This attitude is understandable, but it must also be recognised that a person may have objections to joining a union other than a reluctance to pay the subscription. He may not mind paying for the necessary functions of a trade union, but he might rightly object to part of his subscription being used for certain other purposes. If, for example, he objects to contributing to the Labour Party funds, he should not be denied the opportunity of following a particular occupation. The law requiring the establishment of a separate political levy from which members may contract has gone some way to remedying this situation. A closed shop will not, in fact, mean that a man may be forced to contribute to the funds of a political party as a condition of employment. Nevertheless, union funds may still be used for educational and general propaganda purposes which show a heavy socialist bias.

The union rules may provide that a member may only be expelled if he acts in a certain manner. The rules must describe clearly what kind of actions will lead to expulsion. The recent judgment no doubt means that a union would not be permitted to operate a rule which imposed an unreasonable restriction on the member. If, for example, the rules purported to give the right to expel a member who gave active support to a particular political party, there is now little doubt that the Court would not accept this. On the other hand, the Courts might well accept a rule which gave the right to expel a member who refused to obey a strike call, even though he conscientiously believed that such a

strike call was unjustified.*

An even more serious consideration is the delays that will be involved in any legal action. If a worker is wrongfully expelled from the union in circumstances which give him a right to sue the union, he may suffer considerable hardship before his case is heard.* Apart from the delays the assessment of damages is often a gamble. It may be possible to make a fairly precise estimate of any loss incurred up to the date of the trial of an action. A man expelled from a union and losing his job because a closed shop is in operation may have had his earnings reduced from an average of £30 a week to £25 a week in consequence. If there has been two years delay, he may have lost, therefore £5 a week for two years, namely £520. This, however, need not be the total loss he will incur. Even if re-instated in membership from the date of the trial, he may not immediately get a job in his old trade, and when he does the level of his earnings may still be less than in his original job. The Courts will try to assess some kind of figure for such future losses, but the figure determined may, in the event, give the plaintiff a windfall gain or it may equally fail to provide him adequate compensation.

The issues involved are complex, but it is certainly time there was a careful review of the law in all fields relating to unions.

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- * Participation in an unjustified strike cannot strictly be justified on the ground that a collective decision has been taken. It is for the individual himself to decide upon the morality of his actions. In general, an individual taking part in a strike he thought unjustified could justify his own action on the grounds (1) his action was not free, and (2) it would normally be impracticable anyway for a small minority to remain at work. Such considerations, however, do not justify drastic action by the union against the member if he does remain at work.
 - * The hardships involved in the delay in hearing a legal action, which may run into years, is, of course, of much more general application than to the field under consideration. There is, therefore, a choice between trying to decide whether to introduce a special labour court in order to expedite matters or to look to a general speeding up of legal procedures. The latter is probably preferable unless a more general review of trade union law provides adequate work for a special court.

Will Catholic schools cease to exist as we know them? Why did Catholics take no part in the production of The New English Bible? Why is it said that our possession of salvation is "mysterious and hidden"?

Any Questions ?

WILLIAM LAWSON, S.J.

Of the three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity, why is it only charity which remains with us in heaven?

If we arrive in heaven, then all that we hoped for will be ours, and we cannot hope for what we already possess. We shall see God to the full extent of our vision; and seeing is not believing. There will be no room in us for any act but that of love, with all its effects of satisfying union with the Blessed Trinity and also with God's household of angels and saints.

As you knew all that without my telling you, I am wondering what puzzlement prompted your question. It arose, perhaps, from our inability to cast our minds forward from time to eternity, and to understand a changeless condition. As we are totally unable to know God as He knows Himself, His infinite Being will remain forever a mystery to us. Does not that mean that we shall have to depend on Him for knowledge of Him, and that we shall continue to hope for yet another degree of direct vision? The answer must be that we cannot live or act beyond the limits of our creature and our particular personal version of human nature, but that, when we are filled to the very limit of our capacity, we cannot be other than satisfied. We are so used to living

under a law of progress, to moving from one stage of self-realisation to one which gives us greater self-possession, though we cannot accept other than intellectually the idea of resting in our attained perfection. But that very lack of a sense of perfection should help us to rejoice that we shall one day be done with faith and hope and be filled with love.

How is the Church wounded by the sins of her members, and what implications does this have for the sacrament of penance?

From the description of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, it is clear that the quality of our lives has a community as well as an individual effect. In the comparison which St. Paul makes between the bodily organism and the Church, there is a manifest interdependence of members. The body is not fully healthy if even the least important of the organs or functions is unwell; and the Church suffers from the spiritual illness of those belonging to it. Positively, a sick body is helped by whatever in it is sound: the soundness goes into circulation and contributes to the recovery of general health. In the same way, the goodness that is in the Church — the infinite goodness of Christ, the Head, and the holiness of His members — is available for all who are in any way united with Him for the imparting and receiving of supernatural life. The likeness to the physical body ceases at that point; because good and bad in the moral order do not circulate naturally like the blood: they must wait on acceptance or rejection by the human will. They are, however, a source of health or illness available always and for everybody. The good makes for strength and the bad for weakness.

Each member, then, has a responsibility not only for himself but for the Church. If he commits sin he should repent for his triple failure — he has offended God, failed himself and let down the Church. His purpose of amendment should be positive: to love God, to make himself better by doing God's will, and to help the Church by adding to her store of goodness on which all can draw.

Why is it said that our possession of salvation is "mysterious and hidden"?

Mainly because we cannot have an absolute certainty that we are in a state of grace, nor can we take for granted the ultimate grace of final perseverance. Of our supernatural state we can have what is called a moral certainty, which is meant an assurance, founded on faith and hope, that we are justified in acting like people in a state of grace. You know the distinction between "sacraments of the living" and "sacraments of the dead". We need to consult our conscience in order to decide what should be our reception of the sacraments — for example whether or not we are strictly bound to seek sacramental absolution before receiving Holy Communion. After an honest judgement according to conscience and the taking of the action which conscience prescribes, we have the moral certainty of being in union with God.

We have to "work out our salvation in fear and trembling". We are not confirmed in grace, and we can lose it. Knowing ourselves, we hardly need the warning: "He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall". Not only must we have the grace of God for every salvific action, we also depend on God's providence to be found watchful when the Lord comes, and to make our exit from this world at a moment of time when we are fit to go into the next. It is Our Lord Himself who tells us that this visitation is like that of a thief in the night. Like the rest of our future, its conclusion is hidden. We should, with the help of God, so face it that its mystery is for us the mystery of God's mercy.

Will Catholic schools cease to exist as we know them?

To know Catholic schools in this country is to know several kinds of schools. As they have different prospects of survival, to prophesy a common future for them would be

more than usually rash. If a government were to force schools into a uniform national system, and if Catholics were to submit to that tyranny, then we should no longer have denominational schools. There is at present a strong body of opinion directed against independent schools, and if it prevailed some Catholic foundations would disappear. Pressure is also being brought to bear on grammar schools to make them change their character. The pressure exerted by the threat to withhold public financial support, and it might force some of the Catholic grammar schools into a precarious independence.

Those Catholic schools which, though denominational, are part of the general system of primary and secondary Education, are not so secure as they used to be. They do not receive universal support from Catholics, some of whom are indifferent, while others question their value as religious establishments. It is argued that at least the secondary schools make no adequate return in terms of Catholic allegiance for the money Catholics have to pay to keep their own schools, and it is suggested that after a Catholic primary education children should go to undenominational schools. The experts ought certainly to be heard on the subject; but the decision surely rests with parents and the hierarchy, and both, I think, are in favour of keeping Catholic secondary schools.

Catholic schools mean Catholic teachers. When the future of the schools is being considered, some attention might be paid to the phenomenon of graduates of Catholic training colleges reluctant or downright unwilling to teach religion.

Why did Catholics take no part in the production of The New English Bible? In the interests of Ecumenism, shall we be allowed to use it?

As far as I can make out, this latest English translation of the Bible was undertaken primarily as a work of literature to produce a text faithful to the original and in current

terary English. The Protestant churches which sponsored the project looked naturally to their own members to provide the team of experts in language to do the work, and they were easily able to compete their team without calling on English Catholics. The relations between them and the Catholics were most courteous; but, as you say, Catholics were not called on to help. The undertaking was not thought to be one of interpretation and therefore possibly controversial. The edition is just a straightforward text, with no theological notes; and for Catholics there is a version that includes books, the Apocrypha, not contained in the Protestant canon of Holy Scripture.

The question of ecumenical advantage in the use by Catholics of *The New English Bible* can be shelved until it is in general public use by Protestants themselves. They have the *Revised Standard Version*, of which there is an authorised Catholic Edition. The language of it seems to be generally acceptable, and that version should serve as common ground.

I can't see why the use of one and the same text by Catholics and Protestants is so important to ecumenism. Difference in detail of translation is never so radical that it implies serious theological divergence. The basic difference between Catholics and Protestants exists before they seek a common text of Scripture, and it persists after they have found one — it is the difference introduced by private interpretation.

Our Lord says: "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect." Surely this is to ask the impossible of a finite nature.

Surely not! A finite nature can have its own completeness, and that is the perfection we are bidden to attain. Ultimately we must reach it, to be admitted to the presence of God forever. Our task in this life is to get as near to it as we can, with the grace of God; and the way to it is by following the teaching and example of Christ. As we are made in the image

and likeness of God, it is reasonable that we be asked to make ourselves into a perfect likeness. In our finite way we can mirror the infinite goodness of God, because God requires and enables us to do so. As St. Augustine says: "God does not command the impossible. He tells us to do what we can do, and to ask for help for what we can't do — and then He helps us to do it."

Your quotation is from what is called the Sermon on the Mount. It follows our Lord's teaching on the love of enemies. God's love created us and redeemed us. When we were unlovable because of sin God loved us. If we manage to love his friends and not enemies it is by the creative power of His love. That is to be the pattern of our own relationships with enemies. We cannot create or redeem, but we can make a brightness and a warmth in which enemies can be helped to accept the grace of God. Hard though that may be, it has been done by countless Christians in imitation of Christ as a share in his redemptive work. It could be a facet of our own perfection.
